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In 2009, the Coast Guard Surface Forces Logistics Center implemented a 
reliability program in an effort to improve mission availability of its aging surface 
fleet.  This thesis is an exploratory analysis of the current status of the newly 
implemented program using Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) and statistical 
techniques with the objective of determining how the shift to reliability-centerd 
maintenance has affected the availability of the medium endurance cutter flee .  The 
SSM analysis led to the examination of eight (8) years of cutter machinery failu e 
data as a measure to transform cutter maintenance. This revealed lower than desired 
availability percentages and a worsening trend in cutter availability over tim .  Key 
opportunities for improvement are identified as well as several next analysis steps or 
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With recent events such as Hurricane Katrina of 2005 and the Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill of 2010 affecting our nation and the earthquake that hit Haiti, the United States
Coast Guard has been under the spotlight with major response efforts in addition to the 
other mandated missions that must be performed.  In 2010 alone, the “Coast Guard also 
saved more than 4,300 lives, responded to more than 22,000 search and rescue cases, 
prevented more than 200,000 pounds of cocaine from reaching the U.S., boarded more 
than 2,100 High Interest Vessels bound for U.S. ports, interdicted nearly 4,700 
undocumented migrants attempting to illegally enter the United States from the sea, and 
conducted more than 5,000 fisheries conservation boardings” [1].  The increase on the 
already high operational tempo puts more pressure on Coast Guard engineers to maintain
an aging cutter fleet.  Reliability, availability, and maintainability are the top priorities in 
the Coast Guard’s surface fleet engineering program.  Reliability cen ered maintenance 
principles are being employed to maximize the availability of cutters in order to complete 
all Coast Guard missions.  It is imperative that analytical tools and methods are employed 
to utilize all assets to their potential safely and effectively.   
 
1.1   Coast Guard Overview   
The Coast Guard is the smallest of the United States’ five armed forces and 
operates under the Department of Homeland Security.  As of May 2010, the Coast Guard 




civilians and 30,000 auxiliary members.  The Coast Guard currently is mandated by law 
to conduct the following primary missions:   
1. Ports, waterways and coastal security:  This is the Coast Guard’s designated 
primary mission.  This mission involves protection of the U.S. maritime 
domain to include counterterrorism (offensive) actions, antiterrorism 
(defensive) actions and response operations. 
 
2. Drug interdiction :  The Coast Guard combats the flow of illegal drugs into 
the United States over a six million square mile area.  In 2009, almost 400,000 
pounds of cocaine and over 35,000 pounds of marijuana were seized.  The 
Coast Guard’s cocaine seizures account for approximately fifty percent of 
total U.S. seizures. 
 
3. Aids to navigation:  The Coast Guard provides continuous monitoring and 
control of navigation and positioning systems to include differential global 
positioning system, nationwide automated identification system and visual 
aids to navigation (buoys, lighthouses, etc.). 
 
4. Search and rescue:  Search and rescue is one of the oldest and most-well 
known Coast Guard missions.  Search and rescue units are located throughout 
the entire contiguous U.S. and in all outlying states and territories.  Since its 
inception the Coast Guard has saved over 1,000,000 lives.   
 
5. Living marine resources:  This mission gives the Coast Guard authority to 




encroachment.  Authority is also given to enforce domestic fisheries laws 
which protect marine mammals.  Development and enforcement of 
international fisheries agreements also occurs under this mission. 
 
6. Marine safety:  This mission focuses on the maritime industry and its 
success.  The Coast Guard works hand in hand with civilians in every major 
and minor port to maintain continuous commerce through vessel and port 
inspections. 
 
7. Defense readiness:  Prior to September 11, 2001, at times of war, the Coast 
Guard operated under the Navy.  After 9/11, defense readiness took on a new 
meaning and now the Coast Guard has a daily defense readiness regimen that 
is heightened as terror threats occur.   
 
8. Migrant interdiction :  Illegal immigration has been a growing problem for 
the United States since the 1980 mass exodus from Cuba.  In the 1990’s, a 
mass exodus occurred from Haiti as well.  Today, the Coast Guard intercepts 
migrants from these and other Caribbean nations, as well as from several 
Asian nations.  The Coast Guard conducts this mission primarily as protection 
of loss of life at sea. 
 
9. Marine environmental protection:  This mission is to “develop and enforce 
regulations to avert the introduction of invasive species into the maritime 




spills” [2].  Since 2008, emergency and incident management response was 
added under the scope of this mission. 
 
10. Ice operations:  Northern waterways are kept navigable year-round for 
commerce through the Coast Guard’s ice-breaking operations.  The Coast 
Guard also provides the only year-round access to the polar regions.   
 
11. Other law enforcement:  The Coast Guard enforces other domestic and 
international laws pertaining to fisheries, maritime safety, and maintainig the 
waterways. 
 
The accomplishment all of these missions relies on the Coast Guard’s physical 
assets at sea, on land and in the air.  There are currently 248 cutters (a Coast Guard vessel 
that is 65 feet or greater), 1,784 boats (less than 65 feet) and 198 aircraft [2].  A listing of 
the classes of each type of asset is given below: 
 Cutters:    420' Icebreaker  
     418' National Security Cutter  
     399' Polar Class Icebreaker  
    378' High Endurance Cutter  
    295' Training Barque Eagle  
   282' Medium Endurance Cutter  
    270' Medium Endurance Cutter  
   240’ Seagoing Buoy Tender/Icebreaker 
    225' Seagoing Buoy Tender  
     210' Medium Endurance Cutter  
    179' Patrol Coastal  
    175' Coastal Buoy Tender  
    160' Inland Construction Tender  
    140' Icebreaking Tug 
    110' Patrol Boat  
    100' Inland Buoy Tender  
    100' Inland Construction Tender  




    75' River Buoy Tender  
    75' Inland Construction Tender  
    65' River Buoy Tender  
    65' Inland Buoy Tender  
65' Small Harbor Tug  
 
 Boats:        47' Motor Life Boat  
       41' Utility Boat  
      21'-64' Aids to Navigation Boats 
      25' Transportable Port Security Boat  
        25' Defender Class Boats 
 
 Aircraft:  HC-130H Hercules 
         HU-25 Guardian 
             HH-60 Jayhawk 
         H-65 Dolphin    
   
To accomplish the varying missions, assets are designed to be multi-mission, such 
as conducting search and rescue operations one day and interdicting drugs the next.  
Operating and maintaining multi-mission assets is costly.  The Coast Guard operates with 
a total budget of approximately ten billion dollars with only $62 million going towards 
surface and air asset operation and maintenance and $856 million going towards 
production of new cutters and major maintenance overhauls of older “legacy” cutters.  
Legacy cutters are the high and medium endurance cutters (HEC and MEC) that have 
long been the workhorses of the modern Coast Guard.  On average, these cutters are 
forty-one years old, while Navy assets are on average only fourteen years old [3].  In 
order to accomplish all of the aforementioned missions, maintenance is a growing 
concern to ensure availability of cutter assets when required. 
 
1.2   Surface Fleet Reliability Engineering Program 
 The Coast Guard is currently undergoing an organizational modernization, 




decommissioning of the long range enforcer cutters and delays in the commissioning of 
the new national security cutters, more emphasis on mission completion has been 
delegated to the medium endurance cutters (MEC).  These aging cutters are expect d to 
meet a minimum of ninety percent availability during the fifty-five percent mi imum of 
the year (i.e., 4,820 hours per year minimum) that each cutter deploys.  Maintenance 
periods have grown shorter as patrols have increased which has necessitated multiple 
crew rotations.  Constant funding constraints have caused continuous amounts of deferred 
maintenance, jeopardizing the availability of cutters to meet operational needs.  A large 
portion of the modernization program focuses on engineering and maintenance with 
emphasis on streamlining maintenance through the implementation of a reliability 
engineering program within the surface fleet.   
 1.2.1 Setting the Foundation through Coast Guard Aviation 
 The surface fleet community is implementing a reliability program based on the 
aviation community’s program, which is simply described as the “aviation model.”  
Before giving a brief overview of the aviation model and how the surface fleet is trying to 
mimic this, it is important to understand how the current aviation model came to fruiti n 
within the Coast Guard.  The aviation industry as a whole started investigating new 
maintenance methods of improving aircraft reliability in the 1960’s through a joint effort 
of the Federal Aviation Administration and the airlines.  Out of this effort came the 
MSG-1 Handbook which detailed the development of preventive maintenance for new 
aircraft, specifically, the Boeing 747 [16].  This document was updated several times over 




promoting optimized and cost effective maintenance, thus laying the foundation for the
reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) programs in use today [4].   
Prior to the nineties, the Coast Guard aviation program conducted preventive 
maintenance through routine and specified inspections, replacements, or overhauls.  
Unplanned maintenance was dealt with on a case by case basis, with little to no trend 
analysis to predict future casualties.  While preventive maintenance can restore a 
component’s inherent reliability, it cannot improve upon it.  Manufacturers’ maintenanc 
recommendations were made the standard, regardless of operating conditions.  All 
maintenance was, and still is, conducted mainly by Coast Guard technicians who also 
serve as members of the aircrew, operating the aircraft during each mission.  This creates 
a unique environment in that those individuals who conduct maintenance are also the 
operators, thereby jeopardizing their own safety if reliability is compromised.   
In the seventies, the Coast Guard aviation program implemented a new and 
progressive maintenance program based on the FAA MSG-1 Handbook.  With the strictly 
preventive maintenance program, maintenance tasks were conducted in large groups;
however, in the new progressive program, each individual maintenance task was 
conducted and tracked separately.  It was not until the nineties, when a reorganization of 
the aviation community created a centralized and streamlined maintenance mage ent 
program, that the current RCM program was fully introduced into the aviation 
community [5].    
 1.2.2 Shift in Maintenance Ideology for the Surface Fleet 
Like the aviation community, preventive maintenance was the dominating theory 




inspections, overhauls and even expensive drydocks occurred at set intervals regardless 
of the condition of the machinery or cutter as a whole.  This type of maintenance not only 
did not improve the reliability or availability of machinery, but sometimes even worsened 
it.  Both large-scale and small-scale root cause failure analyses revealed that incorrect and 
unnecessary maintenance often contributed to component casualties.  This, and other 
organizational factors, sparked the transformation towards aligning surface fleet 
maintenance with the aviation model.   
In 2000, the Coast Guard’s surface fleet engineering community took the first 
steps in implementing RCM procedures in order to meet the maintenance demands 
currently on the Medium Endurance Cutter (MEC) fleet.  Use of RCM was mandated in 
2004 in the Naval Engineering Manual in order to develop optimal maintenance 
requirements.  In 2009, the full-scale surface fleet reliability engineering program was 
approved for implementation.  It was impossible to implement a cookie cutter copy of the 
aviation model due to the operational and configuration differences of cutters compared 
to air assets.  Like in the commercial aviation industry, each class of the Coast Guard’s 
air assets are configured exactly the same.  Any qualified pilot can fly y operational 
asset that they have trained on in the Coast Guard.  Maintenance is also conducted 
exactly the same way utilizing kits based on the task.  When maintenance is conducted on 
an aircraft, it is completely unavailable for the repair duration until all systems are one 
hundred percent.  Cutter operation and maintenance does not work like this, though in an 
ideal world, it would.  All cutter personnel, regardless of their having been on a simil r 
cutter in the past, must re-qualify on the new cutter because of its nuances and different 




parts are expensive, have long lead acquisition times, or are even obsolete and no longer 
supportable due to their age.  When a component breaks on a cutter, it is not tied to the 
pier until repairs are complete.  As long as it can get underway (deploy) safel , it will, 
and the maintenance will occur as time and parts availability allows.   
Another major difference between the aviation and surface fleets is the fac that 
cutter crews have to live and work onboard the cutter.  This causes many deviations from 
a standard machinery configuration that cutters strive to maintain.  The crew obviously 
wants to make the cutter a better environment for them to live and work, and do not 
consider the repercussions of modifying layout and components because it does not affect 
their direct safety.  The impact on operational readiness and availability due to logistics, 
however, is quite large.  Buy-in from all organizational levels has been a constant 
challenge during the implementation of both the air and surface reliability programs.  The 
“old” way of doing business was personality-dependent, with many tasks completed and 
resources found based on who you know in what job.  The new process-dependent 
system opposes the cultural environment in place within the maintenance and logistics 
realm.  To counteract opposition and gain buy-in, the reliability program must clearly 
define its goals, processes, and how it affects individuals on a personal basis.   
Because of the aforementioned challenges, the implementation of the reliability 
program began on a small scale with the small boat product line.  This product line, 
which includes all surface assets up to sixty-four feet in length, “aligns all bo t support 
resources under a single entity with authority and accountability for mainten nc  and 
logistics” [2].  The focus of the product line is “affordable readiness” through a logistics 
transformation process.  In the implementation of the aviation reliability program, 
 
 
maintenance logistics proved to be the most costly and difficult aspect.  It is also the one 
aspect of affordable readiness (see 
processes within the organization [6].  
Because most of the surface fleet assets have been in s rvice for many years (only 
the National Security Cutters are new), the Coast Guard i
process [7].  “Backfit RCM” was developed by Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA) to use operating experience to validate, adjust, or update existing 
maintenance procedures when there is a significant amount of operational and 
maintenance history.  A key aspect of RCM is continuous improvement, meaning that no 
maintenance program should remain the exact same over time.  Implementing “Backfit 
RCM” utilizes this concept in developing optimized maintenance requirements.  “Backfit 
RCM” looks at four main areas:  reliability degradation, task applicability, task 
effectiveness, and recommending change.  First, equipment failure modes are looked at, 
specifically for age degradation and the associated causes.  Each maintenance task is then 
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Figure 1) that can be controlled through more efficient 
 
Figure 1:  Affordable readiness [6] 
 
 





looked at individually for its applicability and effectiveness in restoring inherent 
reliability.  Lastly, any improvements that can be made should be documented and 
implemented [8] 
1.2.3 Assessment of Current State Defines Future Goals  
The problematic current state of the surface fleet reliability engineering program 
defines several key go-forward goals of the Surface Fleet Reliability Engineering 
Program.  First, it is essential to determine a way to integrate the core conc pts of the 
Coast Guard’s aviation reliability engineering model into the surface fleet product lines’ 
maintenance requirements.  When the surface fleet’s reliability program was 
implemented in 2009, the existing organization did not have the infrastructure necessary 
to accomplish the goals outlined in the Reliability Engineering Process Guide, and the 
personnel affected were not prepared for a major organizational transformation.   
Secondly, the surface fleet must determine what data needs to be utilized in order
to fully implement a reliability engineering program.  Once this is establi hed, program 
managers should ascertain whether the necessary data is already being gathered from the 
cutters, or whether a new data-gathering process must be developed and instituted.    
Thirdly, it is essential to develop a method to transform engineering data into 
constructive operational information.  As in other industries, the Coast Guard focuses on 
the bottom line.  In the Coast Guard organization, the bottom line is having the assets 
necessary to complete all required missions.  The way to accomplish this is approached 
very differently by operators and engineers.  Engineers focus on the equipment failures
and ways to prevent failures, while operators want final asset availability percentages.  





1.3   Review of Prior Work 
 Reliability engineering principles and their impact on the Coast Guard have been 
studied over the past thirty years.  Now retired Captain William Spitler (USCG-Ret) 
investigated the possible incorporation of RCM for the aviation program in a Master of 
Science in Management program from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology i  1990 
[5].  As previously mentioned, the aviation fleet introduced reliability principles to 
aircraft maintenance shortly after this timeframe.  In-depth analyses were conducted on 
the air assets such as the loss of in-flight power for the HH-65 helicopter engine by CDR 
Donna Cottrell in 2004 [14].  This analysis was of particular importance because it 
investigates correlations between the flight mishaps and engine component replacements, 
as well as the funding and political impacts on mission availability.  Because the Coast 
Guard is a federal agency, politics can play a large role in business operations, sometimes 
negatively impacting the way maintenance must be conducted to meet federal mand tes.  
Based on this study, the Coast Guard revised overhaul times for this particular engine,
and conducted further studies on various systems on all the aircraft platforms. 
Using the Coast Guard aviation fleet’s RCM program’s analyses and the United 
States Navy’s RCM programs, the Coast Guard surface fleet community began 
investigating the opportunities and benefits of incorporating RCM principles into cutter
maintenance.  Analyses were conducted in 2008 by outside resources on various critical 
systems (e.g., Firemain, HVAC, Ventilation, Gaylord hood, etc.) to determine their s atus 




Figure 2.   The final conclusions of these analyses recommended “continued diagnostics 
using RCM principles to determine the root cause of failures” [15]. 
 
Figure 2:  Breakdown of Failures by Subsystem for the Firemain System tak n 
from 2008 Engineering Logistics Center (now SFLC) Report 
 
While individual components and some systems have been analyzed from a 
reliability standpoint, the program as a whole has only begun being analyzed.  The firm, 
“Linton, Galle, and Harris”, the Coast Guard’s leading RCM process consultants, have 
published numerous documents on implementation of RCM into the USCG surface fleet.  
They published “RCM Baseline for USCG Maintenance Development” in 2009 
discussing how RCM-based principles could revamp the current maintenance system into 
a more effective program within the modernization and logistics transformati n t king 
place at that time [7].   
The research accomplished in this thesis will provide the Coast Guard senior 
leadership an overview of how cutter availability relates to overall mission availability 




that lead to operational downtime, the naval engineering program can determin  if new 
systems should be introduced or maintenance procedures revised to improve system 
reliability.  This thesis will also provide recommendations for improvements to the 
surface fleet reliability program and how individuals within naval engineering ca  adapt 
to the new program. 
 
1.4   Research Questions and Thesis Organization 
Based on the go-forward goals of the Coast Guard reliability engineering program 
described above and a review of the prior work done in this area, this thesis will consider 
four basic research questions as follows:  
1. What is the status of the Coast Guard’s reliability engineering program within the 
surface fleet? 
2. How can engineering data about cutter maintenance activities be transformed into 
constructive operational information about availability? 
3. How has the shift in maintenance ideologies impacted the medium endurance 
cutters’ availabilities? 
4. How can the Surface Forces Logistics Center improve its implementation of the 
reliability engineering program? 
 
Accordingly, the thesis is organized as follows:  Chapter 1 provides subject matter 
background, a review of prior work, and a clear definition of the basic research questions 
to be examined and answered by this thesis.   Chapter 2 begins with an overview of soft 




endurance cutter (MEC) fleet reliability engineering program.  Chapter 3 details the data 
analysis of casualty reports over a seven year time period, and analyzes how component 
and system failures affect mission availability for medium endurance cutters.  Lastly, 
Chapter 4 provides a summary of findings, discussions, conclusion, and 





Investigation of  
USCG’s Medium Endurance Cutter Reliability Program 
 
2.1   Organization, Resources, and Processes 
To understand the problematic situations surrounding the surface fleet reliability 
engineering program and answer research question two, “What is the status of he C ast 
Guard’s reliability engineering program within the surface fleet?”, one must first have a 
general understanding of the Surfaces Forces Logistics Center (SFLC), the entity that 
owns the reliability program.  The SFLC, whose mission is to “provide the surface fleet 
and other assigned assets with depot level maintenance, engineering, supply, logistics and 
information services to support Coast Guard missions,” is a large unit consisting of five 
divisions and five product lines as shown in Figure 3 [2].  
 





The divisions and a brief description of each are provided below: 
 Asset Logistics:  The fiscal, finance, supply and logistics resource for the entire 
command structure. 
 Business Operations:  Ensure the product lines have the information they require on a 
timely basis and that the organization focuses on affordable readiness. 
 Engineering Services:  Manages asset maintenance and logistics support to include 
the naval architecture section, the aging cutter and boat branch which controls the 
reliability program, and other specific technical sections. 
 Industrial Operations:  Oversees all naval engineering support units. 
 Contracting and Procurement:  Has sole authority and control over contracting and 
procurement for all surface assets [2]. 
The product lines are:  small boat product line (SBPL); patrol boat product line 
(PBPL); ice breaker, buoy and construction tender product line (IBCTPL); medium 
endurance cutter product line (MECPL); and the long range enforcer product line 
(LREPL).  The product lines and support units are geographically-distributed throughout 
the country based on the location of assets to provide the best support for all cutters and 





Figure 4:  Location of Engineering/Logistics Units [13] 
 
Each product line is divided into four branches, each with specific roles and 





Figure 5:  MEC Product Line Organizational Chart 
 
 Engineering:  Consists of asset management and systems sections for unplanned 
maintenance. 
 Depot Maintenance:  Consists of availability project management section for planned 
maintenance and manages port engineers who are on-site product line representativ  
at the assets for major maintenance availabilities. 
 Supply:  Handles all supply issues through an inventory management team and a 
customer service section. 
 Procurement:  Individuals under the main Contracting and Procurement division that 





2.2   Application of Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) to Current Problem 
 Systems engineering methodology and techniques have long been used to tackle 
technical problems in a variety of industries.  However, not all problems can be solved 
using only mathematical and quantitative techniques (“hard” approaches).  In many 
cases, improving a real world system requires a “soft” approach that considers multiple 
perspectives and attempts to create a synthesis that better explains the problem situation 
and leads to feasible, desirable improvements.  The system analyzed in this thesis 
encompasses the following features.  The system has a purpose and achieves a 
transformation (i.e. maintenance that ‘transforms’ cutters).  It has metrics to measure 
performance and a decision-making management structure.  It has components 
(divisions/departments) that are related and interact with each other.  The system exists as 
part of a broader system but also has its boundaries that define what is in and what is not 
in the system.  The system also has its own resources.  Lastly, the system expects 
continuity to the future and will adapt as necessary [9].   
In 1966 Peter Checkland and other researchers developed the Soft Systems 
Methodology (SSM) which 1) provides a framework to evaluate the way individuals 
interact with various system processes from their different viewpoints, and 2) provides a 
tool for discovering and implementing improvements into the system.  This thesis 
investigates the Coast Guard’s surface fleet reliability engineering program using the 
SSM, focusing on the medium endurance cutters of the 210’ Reliance Class and 270’ 
Famous Class platforms.   
To use Soft Systems Methodology (SSM), one has to operate both in the real 




in the systems world where the focus is on the system processes.  Because of this, the 
SSM is best understood in a diagram format as shown in Figure 6 below.   
 
 
Figure 6:  Summary of Methodology [10] 
 
 
The SSM is an investigative process.  It provides the framework for thinking 
about complex human interaction situations and formulating potential solutions.  The 
process is not as “clean” or easy as one might expect based on the above diagram.  It is 




multiple times with multiple iterations to move from step to step.  Each methodology step 
is detailed below.   
1. Unstructured problem situation:  This step is merely where a problematic 
situation is identified.   
 
2. Expressed problem situation:  In this step, the problematic situation is 
visualized in a “rich picture.”  The rich picture is a tool that combines the 
perceptions of many individuals across all levels of the problematic situation 
to provide an accurate depiction of human interactions within the 
organization.  The rich picture can display the complex situation in manner, so 
that the problematic areas can be identified and sorted out more easily.  The 
rich picture is not a “pretty” depiction of the system; it is often quite messy.  It 
should not contain every detail of the system, but just the important elements 
from the many perception viewpoints.  An example of a rich picture (about 







Figure 7:  Rich picture example [11] 
3. Develop root definition:  Determining the root definition of the system is the 
crux, or critical step, in the methodology.  Instead of focusing on what the 
system is not providing, one must first determine the purpose, or root, of the 
system, hence the root definition.  There are three parts to the root definition:  
what the system does; how it should be done; and why it is being done.  In 
order to develop a comprehensive root definition, the acronym CATWOE is 
often used to ensure all essential pieces of the system are included.  CATWOE 
revolves around “T”, the Transformation process through which the input to 
the system becomes the output of the system.  “C” are the Customers, or those 
who are affected by the transformation process.  “A” are the Actors who do 




for Weltanschauung, the worldview that makes the root definition meaningful.  
“O” are the Owners who control the transformation process.  Lastly “E” are 
the Environmental concerns that are outside of the system’s control, but still 
affect its processes.   
 
4. Build conceptual model:  Creating a conceptual model of a system is often 
the most challenging step in the SSM process. A conceptual model will 
demonstrate the activities as defined by one’s root definition.  The conceptual 
model should describe the system using only a minimal number of verbs to 
show the core of the system.  An example of a conceptual model for a 
healthcare scenario is given below in Figure 8 along with the system’s root 
definition and CATWOE.  During this step each human activity should be 
analyzed to determine if it meets the three E’s which are efficacy, efficiency, 
and effectiveness.  Within the system there should be mechanisms in place to 






Figure 8:  National Healthcare System in “England and Wales” Conceptual Model [12] 
 
 
5. Compare conceptual model with reality:  During this stage, the systems 




developed conceptual model.  The purpose of this comparison is to generate 
possible solutions/changes to assuage the problem situation.  The comparison 
must be accomplished through an in-depth systems viewpoint, not merely a 
surface comparison of two diagrams. 
 
6. Accessing feasible and desirable change:  The comparison of the conceptual 
model and the rich picture should be used to discuss what changes could be 
implemented, and what effect the changes would have on the system.  There 
are three types of changes that should be investigated:  structural changes, 
procedural changes, and attitude changes.  Structural changes are those 
changes that are made to elements of the system which do not typically 
change such as functional responsibility and reporting chain of commands.  
Procedural changes are made to more fluid elements of the system like a 
reporting process.  Attitude changes are changes to the human perceptions of 
those that interact within the system.   
 
7. Action to improve the problem situation:  Once the feasible and desirable 
changes are agreed upon, they should be implemented to improve the problem 
situation.  While structural and procedural changes are more straightforward 
and easier to implement, attitude changes can present challenges since human 
emotions and thought processes are involved [10].  This is a classic example 
of  “Change Management” and part of the improvement actions involve 
certain actions to enable or facilitate the people who are affected by the 




2.3   Analysis of Problem Situation 
2.3.1  Unstructured Problem Situation 
 This thesis focuses primarily on how the newly implemented reliability 
engineering program affects the MECPL processes.  The MECPL is comprised of th  
282’, 270’, and 210’ cutters, with 1, 13, and 14 cutters, respectively, still in service.  The 
282’ is not included in the data analysis due to its one of a kind platform and the fact that 
it operates more as a LRE asset.  The MEC’s are eleven percent of the entire cutter fleet 
(see Table 1), and are on average the oldest cutters still in operation in the fleet.  Because 
of this, their maintenance requirements are different and more critical than the newer 
cutters in order to maintain their operational readiness.  The MECs complete the widest 
range of mandated Coast Guard missions, which emphasizes their importance and implies 
that analyzing their maintenance history will provide availability data for  variety of 
applications, as discussed in Chapter 3.  The MEC’s were also chosen because the 
researcher is more familiar with the platforms due to her having been stationed aboar
CGC Vigilant, a 210’ cutter, as Assistant Engineer Officer and as a Port Engineer at a 
Naval Engineering Support Unit for several 210’s and 270’s where she was responsible 





Percentage of Cutter 
Fleet 
420' Icebreaker 1 0.40 
418' National Security Cutter 2 0.81 
399' Polar Class Icebreaker 2 0.81 
378' High Endurance Cutter 12 4.84 
295' Training Barque Eagle 1 0.40 
282' Medium Endurance Cutter 1 0.40 




240' Seagoing Buoy 
Tender/Icebreaker 1 0.40 
225' Seagoing Buoy Tender 16 6.45 
210' Medium Endurance Cutter 14 5.65 
179' Patrol Coastal 3 1.21 
175' Coastal Buoy Tender 14 5.65 
160' Inland Construction Tender 4 1.61 
140' Icebreaking Tug 8 3.23 
110' Patrol Boat 41 16.53 
100' Inland Buoy Tender 2 0.81 
100' Inland Construction Tender 1 0.40 
87' Coastal Patrol Boat 73 29.44 
75' River Buoy Tender 12 4.84 
75' Inland Construction Tender 8 3.23 
65' River Buoy Tender 6 2.42 
65' Inland Buoy Tender 2 0.81 
65' Small Harbor Tug  11 4.44 
Total 248 100 
Table 1:  Percentage Breakdown of Cutter Fleet (> 64 ft Length) 
 
 





Figure 10:  210’ Medium Endurance Cutter, CONFIDENCE [2] 
 
2.3.2   Expressed Problem Situation 
 To express the problem situation, a general diagram of the integral organizational 
units/areas to the MEC reliability engineering program was developed.  This diagram 
shown below (Figure 11) gave a starting point of the key personnel to interview and what 
entities and processes should be focused on in the rich picture and further system 
analysis.  The major players and available resources at each unit are listed, and the 
interactions between these units are shown, but not in a hierarchal or information flow 




   
Figure 11:  Initial MEC Reliability Program Diagram 
 
Developing the rich picture of the MEC reliability engineering program involved 
interviewing individuals across all levels of the naval engineering organization to gain as 
many viewpoints as possible within the reliability engineering program.  The Aging 
Cutters and Boats branch at SFLC was a logical starting point to gather initial 
information from which to develop a rich picture of the reliability engineering pro ram.  
This branch is composed of civilian employees supplemented with minimal activedu y 
members, who are responsible for implementing the reliability engineering program 
across the existing cutter fleet.  These individuals detailed the issues their branch has had 
since the reliability program came online in 2009.  Two major issues stood out among the 
other more logistic-related issues.  First is the issue of establishing credibility with the 




at high levels in the command structure.  While specific opposition to the reliability 
program does not exist, resistance to change is found at the lower levels.  The goal is to 
have a senior reliability engineer within each product line; however, in order for this to 
occur, there needs to be program advocates (or champions) at all management levels to 
help justify the position’s existence and purpose.  The second major issue is gatherin 
usable data from the fleet.  The reliability team is currently working with the SBPL to 
trend data to set a baseline for mission-critical components and restore their inherent 
reliability.  Without proper data from the fleet, this trending will be inaccurate.  This 
issue also goes back to stressing the importance of the reliability program to ensure buy-
in from those inputting the data. 
An in-depth investigative look into the problematic situation began with mid-level 
managers who run the product line.  The product line provides complete logistic and 
engineering support for assets that fall into their category.  These individuals nteract with 
personnel both at lower and higher levels in the organization. Because of this, the mid-
level managers would provide the best overall picture of the current reliability program 
and how the information flows throughout the various management levels.  The mid-level 
managers interviewed consisted of the following positions:   
 Asset Manager (AM) responsible for unplanned maintenance necessary due to 
a casualty;  
 Asset Project Manager (APM) responsible for all planned maintenance usually 
in the form of dockside and drydock availabilities;  
 Planned Depot Maintenance Branch Manager (PDM) who controls the branch 





After detailing the information flow, a recurring frustration revealed itself amongst the 
individuals.  The product line, who spends a large amount of time gathering fleet data, 
does not understand the real bottom line objective of the reliability program.  The 
gathered data sits in a database or document, and only rarely is the loop completed with 
maintenance procedures or product line processes changing because of the information.  
Thus, while data is being “collected”, it is not being fully “mined.”  From these 




The rich picture shown above centers on the cutter, because bottom line of the 
process is to have the cutter operational.  Currently, the organi
cutter should be available ninety
cutters are deployed from homeport 185 days out of the year for scheduled missions.  
While the cutter is deployed, it always has a primay mi
tasking that is deemed necessary.  The Coast Guard says that they can complete any 
mission, anytime, anywhere; therefore, assets need to be available at a moment’s notice.  
33 
Figure 12:  Initial Rich Picture 
 
zation has dictated that the 
-seven percent of its operational time.  On average, 




While in homeport, maintenance is the crew and supporting commands’ primary focus. 
Maintenance is either completed by the crew itself or through contractors.  In-depth 
maintenance periods (drydocks and docksides) where large amounts of work are to be 
completed are scheduled approximately every eighteen (18) months.  Maintenance during 
these times periods is completed by outside contractors.   Because the cutters are so old, 
the crew is inundated with maintenance constantly, both at sea and inport.  Because of 
this, providing the requested maintenance reports to the product line becomes a 
secondary thought, thus the data that is captured is often vague and lacking in the 
necessary information to conduct further analyses. 
The next logical step was to investigate the reliability program from the high level 
management stance to see the differing viewpoints.  The Commanding Officer (CO) of 
the SFLC is one of the biggest proponents behind the reliability program implementation.  
The CO works directly for the headquarters engineering branch responsible for Coast 
Guard wide engineering policies and procedures, also a large proponent of the reliability 
program.  This particular CO, a naval aviator, was involved with the implementation of 
the reliability program into the aviation world and provided insight into the similarty of 
today’s challenges and struggles to those twenty years ago in the aviation program.  The 
high-level managers feel that most of the challenges faced in the surface fleet are cultural 
and, through time and training, most issues can be dealt with.  One large difference that 
needs to be implemented into the surface fleet is the concept of a maintenance control 
supervisor, a single person designated to monitor all maintenance tasks for a particular 
asset(s) based on a computer-generated task list.  Within the surface fleet, this 




unnecessary oversight layers that hinder maintenance.  The computer-generator task lists 
for surface assets are also very inaccurate and difficult to work with.   
The next step in the process was to update the initial rich picture based on the 
amplifying information and explanations received from the interviewing process.  The 
final rich picture in Figure 13 is the resulting product.  As seen in the intricate h 
picture, the system is complex, with many individuals, processes, and documents 
involved in order for cutter maintenance to occur.  The rich picture is color-coded to help 
distinguish the entities belonging to specific units.  Red items are those associated with 
Coast Guard Headquarters at a high level in the command structure.  Blue items belong to 
the MEC product line.  Yellow items are specific to the cutter, while the green item is 
outside of the Coast Guard, but interacts with the system.  The papers with a clip 
represent physical documents that are the result of the work of a combination of may of 
the entities.  Lastly, the computer represents the main operating system in which 
information is recorded.  The computer represents the operating system in which all 





Figure 13:  Final Rich Picture 
 
The activities and entities expressed in the final rich picture are of particul  
importance to the system; however, some of these activities and entities are not 
considered critical aspects of the system.  The critical entities and activities within the 







2.4   Root Definition Development  
 Development of the reliability engineering program within the product line scope 
was a crucial step in the investigative process using the SSM.  As discussed in Section 
2.2, the root definition should tell the what, why, and how of the system using action 
words and abstract terms.  Using the rich picture and personal organizational knowledge, 
the root definition of the reliability engineering program is “a cutter maintenance 
system that supports monitoring, reporting, management decision-making, and 
execution of maintenance activities to keep aging cutters operational.”   
The CATWOE for this system is:         
Symbol General Definition Current System 
 
C Customers All Coast Guard Members   
A Actors Engineers 
T Transformation Cutter unavailable  Cutter available 
W Worldwide View Necessary to complete Coast Guard 
missions 
O Owners SFLC 
E Environmental 
Aspects 
Congressional funding; federal 
mandates on operations; constant 
personnel transfers 
 
2.5   Conceptual Model Development 
 The conceptual model gives an account of the activities which the system must do 
in order to be the system named in the root definition.  It should only contain 
approximately five to nine activities because the model does not represent the real world, 
just the root definition.  To begin with, one should consider all the inputs, outputs, and 
action words necessary to go from the input to the output.  Figure 14 shows this initial 





Figure 14:  Initial Conceptual Model 
 
After the development of the initial conceptual model, it should be evaluated 
using the three E’s introduced in Section 2.2 to ensure that each activity has a method of 
determining its performance.  The first E, efficacy, is the system’s ability to produce an 
effect, or is the system working?  To measure this, metrics should be in place to 




comparison of the value of the output of the system to the total resources needed to 
achieve that output.  This is done in order to determine the third E, effectiveness, which is 
a measure of the worth of the new system [9].   For the surface fleet reliability program, 
performance measures are needed to determine if maintenance and casualty repairs occur 
faster and more cost effectively than in the past.  Determining how the three E’s will be 
measured occurs during the comparison between the conceptual model and reality.   
 From the initial conceptual model and determination of the three E’s, a final 
conceptual model was developed (see Figure 15).  The conceptual model differentiates 
between reactive and proactive maintenance.  Reactive maintenance refers to 
maintenance that occurs as a result of a machinery casualty.  Proactive maint nance 
includes both schedule-based and condition-based maintenance.  Proactive maintenance 
does not have to occur on a large-scale such as a drydock or dockside availability.  An 
important note is that funding going into the system comes out of the system as 
operational cutters.  At this point, it cannot be concluded if this model is completely 
correct and appropriate for the real system, but that will be determined during the 
comparison step.  The final conceptual model provides a spark in the debate to discover 





Figure 15:  Final Conceptual Model  
 
2.6   Comparison of Conceptual Model to Reality 
 The purpose of this step is to compare what should happen as described through 
the conceptual model to what actually does happen in the real world situation to spot 
areas that need improvement or modification.  An easy way to make these comparisons is 










Is it done in 
the real 
world? 




Yes On both the 210's and 270's, 
cutter personnel monitor all 
machinery hourly through 
gauges.  Alarms are also 
utilized to provide continuous 
monitoring for abnormalities.  
The 270's have a main 
propulsion control 
management system that uses 
sensors to continuously 
monitor all propulsion 
machinery components.  
Monitoring and recognition 
of an immediate problem 
falls on junior personnel 
with minimal training and 
experience.  The Engineer 
Officer is responsible for 
reviewing all data to notice 
trends in machinery 
operation.  Not all engineer 
officers are fully trained to 




Yes Each cutter maintains its own 
machinery history in CMPlus, 
a computer system that only 
the cutter has access to.  
Product line personnel must 
obtain machinery history from 
the cutter directly.  Casualty 
reports (CASREPs) are sent to 
the product line when a 
component breaks.  These 
CASREPs are maintained in a 
large database in Fleet 
Logistics System (FLS).  Non-
emergent required 
maintenance is captured in the 
cutter's class maintenance plan 
(CMP) that is updated yearly. 
All captured data is based on 
user input, meaning the data 
can vary greatly from one 
cutter to the next.  While 
standard terminology is 
used, the coding of 
equipment using equipment 
identification codes (EIC's) 
is subjective based on the 
individual.  Prioritizing the 
casualty is also subjective.  
CMPs are only updated 
annually and still have many 
inaccuracies.  CMPs are not 
controlled by individuals 




Yes Once a CASREP is issued, the 
Asset Manager has 24 hours to 
set up replacement parts or 
repair work for major 
casualties.  For minor 
casualties the Asset Manager 
works with the cutter Engineer 
Officer to handle the situation 
in a non-emergent manner. 
Because a high priority 
CASREP will get the cutter 
replacement parts faster, 
sometimes the cutter 
"upgrades" their casualty to a 
higher priority than it is.  
When an Asset Manager has 
multiple high priority 
CASREPs to respond to, this 
unnecessary upgrade can 







Is it done in 
the real 
world? 






Yes The Availability Project 
Manager and the cutter work 
together to identify work to be 
completed in a large 
availability period.  This work 
is documented in a Current 
Ship Maintenance Project 
(CSMP) form with FLS to be 
completed during the next 
major contact.  The 
Availability Project Manager 
also sets up stand-alone 
contracts for major items that 
need overhauling or replaced 
prior to the next scheduled 
repair availability. 
 
There Coast Guard uses the 
following tools and 
techniques to try and identify 
future maintenance and any 
machinery trends:  motor 
circuit analysis; diesel 
engine signature analysis; 
vibration monitoring; 
ultrasonic testing; and 
boroscope inspections.   
Execute 
maintenance 
Yes Maintenance is completed by 
the cutter crew, Coast Guard 
engineering support units, or 
outside contractors. 
While there are processes in 
place to close the loop and 
document completed 





No   The program is still in its 
infancy without a real 
presence within the product 
line.  All supervision is 




Table 2:  Comparisons to Conceptual Model 
2.7   Change Assessment – Desirable and Feasible 
 Currently the Coast Guard is going through a modernization and logistics 
transformation.  Because of this, it is difficult to identify structural chnges to the 
reliability engineering program.  Even with all the organizational changes, th re is one 




in a successful implementation, and that is, adding a civilian reliability engin er nto each 
product line.  With the current billet (job assignment) structure, the APM (Asset Proj ct 
Manager) and AM (Asset Manager) do not have the time or resources to gather and trend 
data while simultaneously setting up repair contracts.  A civilian is necessary because it 
needs to be a permanent position, as opposed to a military transfer every three to four 
years.  It would be expected that the civilian employee would be specifically trained in 
reliability engineering in order to gather the required data for each system on their 
specified platform and trend the data to provide maintenance recommendations to the 
product line manager.  Until the large command units have been changed at the macro 
level, determining structural changes at the mid and lower levels, where the biggest 
impact on implementation will occur due the number of personnel, will remain an area 
for future analysis. 
 There are many procedural changes that could be implemented into the reliability 
engineering program.  The casualty reporting system is one such area that has room for 
improvement.  While standard terminology, priority levels, and equipment identification 
codes (EICs) already exist, they are still subjectively used.  The CoastGu rd uses the 
Navy’s EIC list with EICs structured in the following format:   
 1st character – Category 
 2nd character – System 
 3rd character – Equipment or Set 
 4th character – Assembly or Unit 
 5th character – Subassembly or Assembly 
 6th character – Component or Subassembly [17]. 
The current list is so detailed that individuals are unsure as to what EIC their casualty is 
associated with; therefore, they tend to pick whatever seems best, normally the more 




casualty reports an EIC of B10300 for a down main diesel engine control, but another 
reports it as B100000.  The same equipment on a 270’ cutter was reported by the EIC 
BA00000.  Less room for judgment and error in the EIC list needs to be made by 
compressing the list to subsystem levels only.  Parts are not ordered based on this EIC,
but data trending can occur; therefore, increasing the accuracy of EICs increases the 
accuracy of trend reports.  The Coast Guard should modify the Navy list to fit the 
services needs and revamp it to make it more user-friendly.  The EIC list should als be 
reviewed annually to make changes as equipment changes occur on the cutters.   
 Training is also a key aspect of implementing a successful reliability engineering 
program.  Buy-in is needed across all levels for the program to be successfl.  Currently, 
lower level employees, the ones actually doing the maintenance, have not bought into the
program, not because they do not care, but because it has not explained to them.  Training 
can be provided during “A” school, the rate specific school where individuals are trained 
on their job qualifications.  The lower ranking individuals will do as they are trained, a d 
this is a key opportunity to filter information to the fleet on a large-scale.  It will require 
more effort to reach those that have already completed “A” school, but this can be
accomplished by doing road shows to the cutters and support units to provide an 
overview of the reliability engineering program, what it hopes to accomplish, and how 
they (the individuals) fit into the program.   
 A key link between what maintenance occurs on the cutter and the documentation 
received at the product line is the Engineer Officer (EO).  Because of this fact, training 
should be heavily focused on the EO.  Training can be incorporated into the current 




below cutters.  Currently there is not a school/training period for perspective EO’s of 
larger cutters.  A short course could be implemented that would cover the main principles 
of the reliability engineering program.  One important aspect that should be focusd on is 
the under-reporting that occurs.  Many commands feel it reflects poorly on them if 
repeated casualties occur; therefore, some casualties are dealt with through improper 
channels.  This under-reporting only hampers maintenance improvement efforts fleet-
wide. 
 Lastly, there needs to be a closed loop in the maintenance reporting process.  
Cutter crews who do report their maintenance and casualties properly sometimes get 
frustrated with the lack of information they receive back in order to resolve or improve 
the situation.  Also, there are large amounts of data in multiple databases that is not 
touched due to lack of time and knowledge in compiling the information.  The 
aforementioned reliability engineer within the product lines can help to alleviate this 
issue by trending data and reporting back to the fleet their findings.  Attitude changes will 
occur when members are informed.  
 
2.8   Actions to Improve the Problem Situation 
 The analysis presented in Chapter 2 clearly identifies several key areas fo  
improvement in the Coast Guard surface fleet reliability engineering pogram.   The 
following Table 3 summaries several important change opportunities resulting from the 
work presented in Chapter 2 and provides a qualitative assessment of the important of the 







Description of Change Importance 
Ranking 
(Low, Med, High) 
 
1 Billet a civilian Reliability Engineer into 
each Coast Guard fleet product line.  
 
High 
2 Revamp the casualty reporting system 
(CASREP) to make it simpler and more 
accurate.  Note: Customize current Navy 




3 Add a procedure that requires an annual 
update of the EIC list (Equipment 
Identification Codes) to reflect cutter 
equipment changes.  
 
Med 
4 Create and implement a new Reliability 
training program focused on the EO 
(Engineering Officer) during the Afloat 
Engineering Petty Officer School for 
Petty Officers who are prospective new 
EO’s.   
 
High 
5 Add new reliability training program to 




6 Create and implement a “road show” 
method for training and updating current 
engineering personnel on cutters and in 
support units.  Training to include both 
enlisted personnel as well as engineering 
officers.   
 
High  
7 Implement a new “closed loop” process 
into the maintenance reporting process.   
The new process will enable data trending 
of information reported by the fleet and a 










The above changes will take time to implement.  There are daily organizatio al and 
operational challenges that will prevent these changes from occurring overnight, but with 
support and resources from the upper levels of the command, they can filter throughout 
all levels of the organization.  It will need to be a coordinated from both the operations 
and engineering parts of the organization in order to be successful.  
  
2.9   Summary of Investigation 
This chapter investigates the status of the Coast Guard’s reliability engne ring 
program (thesis research question #1) by applying Soft Systems Methodology (SSM).  
Using SSM’s comparison of the conceptual model to reality allows one to readily observe 
both positive aspects and current shortcomings of the current USCG reliability 
engineering program; i.e., what’s working and what needs improvement.    
Key issues discovered include shortcomings in a) procedures, b) personnel 
training, c) casualty reporting system (CASREP), d) an inadequate and out-of-date 
Equipment Identification Code (EIC) list, and e) lack of a closed-loop process whereby 
reliability information and trending data is not being properly fed back to fleet personnel.  
This last item is directly related to thesis research question #2, “how can engine ring data 
about cutter maintenance activities be transformed into constructive operational 
information about availability?”.    
Chapter 2 (Sections 2.7 and 2.8) identifies specific change opportunities for 
significant improvement in the USCG fleet reliability engineering program.  See Section 




Methodology” will analytically investigate actual reliability data from the cutter fleet in 
order to more fully address thesis research questions #2 through #4 and, specifically, 
relate reliability data to actual cutter availability which is the critical measure of program 





Data Analysis and Methodology 
 
 From the SSM process in Chapter 2, it was found that currently, reliability 
engineering analyses and results are not filtered through the engineering community, let 
alone the entire Coast Guard.  It is important to transform asset reliability information 
into a usable form for the operational side of the Coast Guard, so that assets are used 
effectively and efficiently while still being properly maintained from the engineering 
aspect.  This chapter describes the research methods used and the analysis performed in 
the study of mission availability as it relates to casualty reports for the 210’ and 270’ 
cutters.  This study is an exploratory, empirical analysis of system and component 
failures.  The scope of this study is limited to examination of equipment failures from 27 
cutters from October 2003 through January 2011.  Research questions two and three (See 
Section 1.4) will be answered through this analysis. 
 
3.1 Source of Data 
Casualty Report (CASREP) data was obtained through the Coast Guard’s Fleet 
Logistics System (FLS), a centralized cutter logistics database th t works in conjunction 
with other software to maintain cutter configuration, maintenance, and supply.  Data was 
consolidated for both classes of cutters into spreadsheet format, which includes the 
following categories: 
• Resource 




• EIC System  
• EIC Subsystem 
• EIC Code 
• EIC 
• CASREP Number (Each cutter has their own numbering system) 
• CASREP Date 
• CASCOR (Casualty Correct) Data 
• Severity 
• Status 
• CASREP Days (How long the equipment was down) 
 
3.1.1 Explanation of CASREPs 
 CASREPs are a message reporting tool used by non-modernized Coast Guard 
assets to report inoperable or malfunctioning equipment. Currently all product lines, with 
the exception of the SBPL, use CASREPs as their primary reporting method.  There are 
four types of casualty reports:  1) “Initial” to identify the casualty;  2) “Update” to keep 
abreast of any changes with the casualty;  3) “Correct” to notify the product line when the 
equipment is operating properly; and 4) “Cancel” when the equipment was restored by 
unit capabilities.  This thesis analyzes “Initial” and “Correct” CASREPs to identify the 
amount of downtime for each corresponding piece of equipment.   
 CASREPs are assigned a severity category by the unit.  Each category 
corresponds to the amount of mission degradation due to the equipment casualty.  Table 4 




any CASREP, regardless of its severity code, will indicate that the syst m is unavailable.  
In real-world operations, this may not be the case.  Even if a system is degraded, due to 
operational needs such as Hurricane Katrina, a cutter will be used even if it does not 
provide complete mission availability.  Those priorities and judgment calls are m de in 
the operation side of the Coast Guard with input from the engineers. 
Category Code 
This category is not used by Coast Guard units. 1 
Deficiency exists in mission essential equipment which causes a minor 
degradation in a primary mission; or a major degradation or a total loss of 
a secondary mission.  
2 
Deficiency exists in mission essential equipment which causes a major 
degradation, but not the loss, of a primary mission.  
3 
Deficiency exists in mission essential equipment that is worse than 
casualty category 3, and causes a loss of at least one primary mission.  
4 
Table 4:  CASREP Severity Categories 
 
CASREPs only report a single instance of failure.  If investigation of the initial 
failure reveals further equipment failures, new CASREPs must be issued for each 
subsequent component.  This is to ensure that each failed component is identified and 
logistics in place for each replacement.   
 
 3.1.2 Limitations of CASREP Data 
 Although there are reporting requirements, due to the subjective response of cutter 
crews to casualties, this data may not include all component casualties during the period 
of study.  Unit Engineer Officers write CASREPs.  While these officers are trained to 




determining the exact component that failed.  Because of this, many CASREPs are 
general in that they refer to a major component (e.g., main diesel engine) instead of the 
actual component that failed (e.g., raw water pump on the main diesel engine).   
 Other variables that are not examined in this study can affect cutter availability.  
A cutter’s homeport can affect its availability for a particular mission.  For instance, a 
cutter homeported out of Florida does not carry cold weather gear for its crewmembers; 
therefore, if a mission required this, that cutter would be unavailable until the proper 
equipment was obtained.  This thesis only analyzes the large-scale systems necessary for 
mission completion as shown in Section 3.2.1.1. 
 
 3.1.3 Building the Database 
 An original version of the data was maintained in one database, and a modified 
database was created using only the categories necessary for analysis.  Categories that did 
not affect the analysis (CASREP Number, CASREP Date, CASCOR Date, and Status) 
were not used in the initial operational availability calculations for reseach question two.  
Before analysis, the data was inspected for errors and inconsistencies.  Data that was too 
general to determine the failed component or system was taken out of the main data list.  
Examples of usable and unusable data are provided below in Table 5.  Most of the 
unusable data, 1,069 data entries, appears to have been uploaded incorrectly from the 
cutter’s reporting system to FLS, as shown in the first unusable data line for CGC 
Decisive.  Other unusable data was too general to identify the system the CASREP was 
associated with as with the CGC Harriet Lane CASREP.   In total, 1,383 CASREPs out 




necessitated that the CASREPs to be separated into three distinct time periods as follows:  
























































































Table 5:  Examples of Usable vs. Unusable Data 
 
3.2 CASREP Data Analysis 
 Much of the analysis involves categorizing each CASREP with its specific system 
and subsystem, and then mapping the systems to each mission.  Out of the eleven (11) 
mandated missions, the 210’ and 270’ cutters complete seven (7) of them on a routine 
basis.  The missions examined in this study are as follows.  Note:  Mission number is not 




1. Search and Rescue  
2. Migrant Interdiction  
3. Drug Interdiction  
4. Living Marine Resources  
5. Defense Readiness  
6. Port Waterways and Coastal Security 
7. Other Law Enforcement   
  
3.2.1 System to Mission Mapping Using the Goal Tree Success Tree Technique 
 Coast Guard missions are complex to carry out, involving multiple systems 
onboard and associated with the cutter acting simultaneously.  It is vital that each system 
works at the exact moment it is necessary to fulfill its requirement.  Determining the 
required equipment to accomplish a particular mission can be accomplished using an 
application of Goal-Tree-Success-Tree (GTST) technique developed by Dr. Mohammed 
Modarres [20].  The GTST technique is a functional analysis technique used to model 
complex systems by identifying the system objective (goal) and its functions (sub-goals) 
as well as the success paths to the objective as shown in Figure 16 below [20].  The 
GTST technique is used in a variety of applications from plant operations to ship design.  
This thesis examines the use of the GTST technique to consider the mission to system 
mapping in a systematic manner and thus to provide a measure of mission availability 





Figure 16:  GTST Example [20] 
 
3.2.1.1 Creating the Goal Tree 
 To build a GTST, the main goal is identified and broken into sub-goals to form 
the goal tree portion of the technique.  The goal trees for each 210’/270’ mission are 
given below.  When constructing a goal tree, it is implied that all sub-goals are necessary 
to accomplish the overall goal; therefore, an ‘AND’ logic gate is not used [20].  Edraw 





Figure 17:   Coast Guard Mission #1 Goal Tree:  Search and Rescue 
 
  
Figure 18:  Coast Guard Mission #2 Goal Tree:  Migrant Interdiction 
  
 












Figure 21:  Coast Guard Mission #5 Goal Tree:  Defense Readiness 
 
 
















Figure 23:  Coast Guard Mission #7 Goal Tree:  Other Law Enforcement 
 
 
There is some overlap between the different missions and their subgoals because the 
mission definitions are very similar in some cases.  There are two important requirements 
to be concerned with regarding the goal tree portion of the GTST technique:   
1. Looking upwards from any sub-goal towards the target root goal, the top of 
the tree, it is possible to find out explicitly why the specific goal or sub-goal 
must be achieved. 
 
2. Looking downwards from any goal towards the bottom of the tree, it is 





3.2.1.2 Creating the Success Tree 
 
 Once specific hardware must be referred to in order to describe a sub-goal, the 
boundary between the goal tree and the success tree is made.   The success tree th n 
defines the path(s) to achieve the overall goal.  Success trees illustrate the rela ionship 
between the hardware and sub-goals using typical logic gates.  Figure 24 shows the 
success tree for the sub-goal “Transport Migrants from their Vessel to Cutter” for the 





Figure 24:  Success Tree Example 
 
 
 There are are a large number of success trees for the various hardware systems.  
All of the success trees will be compiled to form the total GTST for each Coast Gu rd
Mission. 
 
 3.2.1.3 Combining to Form the Final GTSTs 
 
The use of a GTST is effective for dynamic system goals such as Coast Guard 
missions which can be modified based on the current political and operating 
environments, as well as the changing hardware systems installed on cutters as 
technology improves.  The GTST for the migrant interdiction mission is shown below in 
Figure 25.  GTSTs for the remaining aforementioned Coast Guard missions can be fou d 









3.2.2 Subsystem Availability Calculations 
 One important metric to assess the performance of a repairable system’s 
reliability and maintainability is through availability.  Availability can be looked at 
from a number of ways, but this study will focus on operational availability, or the 








,      
where   A = availability of the system 
  s = system 
n = number of cutters 
  T = total number of days over the 7 year data period 
  r = repair time of i-th CASREP for each system 
  m = total number of CASREPs for each system 
  i = individual CASREP for each system. 
  
Downtime due to routine maintenance was not analyzed due to the unavailability of 
that information.  It is known that cutters do not normally take down equipment for 
routine maintenance during their scheduled operational periods; therefore, any 
downtime associated with routine maintenance would have little effect on the overall 
availability of the cutter for scheduled missions.  That data would come into play 
when cutters that are not scheduled to be operational have to become operational due 
to an increased need for assets such as during the Gulf Oil Spill or Hurricane Katri a.   
 An example of a subsystem calculation for the main diesel engine subsystem 
of propulsion system is given below (Equation 2).  
 
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For this subsystem, a multiplier of 2 is used because there are two identical eng nes 
for each cutter in operation during the time period nT.   
 
3.2.3 Mission Availability Calculations 
 Research question two (See Section 1.4) asks “How can engineering data 
about cutter maintenance activities be transformed into constructive operational 
information about availability?” To answer this, the GTST’s and subsystem 
availability percentages are combined to find the total mission availability for he 
210’ and 270’ cutters. 
Using Microsoft Excel and the above availability equation, the CASREP data 
was analyzed to find the individual subsystem availabilities shown for each mission 
below.  Major system availabilities (A) were calculated using Boolean algebra 
analysis of their respective success logic trees.  Logic tree events ar  referred to in the 
equations by the following: 
Mission Availability - MA 
Propulsion – P 
 #1 Main Diesel Engine Subsystem - #1 MDE 
 #2 Main Diesel Engine Subsystem - #2 MDE 
 Controls - Cp 
 
A   A#1 $%& ' A#2 $%&  A#1 $%&  A#2 $%&(  )* 
Power Generation – PG 
 #1 Ship Service Diesel Generator Subsystem - #1 SSDG 
 #2 Ship Service Diesel Generator Subsystem - #2 SSDG 
 Emergency Diesel Generator Subsystem - EDG 





A+  ,A#1 --%+  A#2 SSDG  AEDG
' 2A#1 SSDG  A#2 SSDG  1  AEDG3
'  A#1 SSDG  1  A#2 SSDG  AEDG
' 21  A#1 SSDG  A#2 SSDG  AEDG34  A C67 
Critical – C 
 Structural Integrity – SI 
 Communications Subsystem – COMMS 
 Navigation Subsystem – N 
 Firemain Subsystem – F 
 Refrigeration Subsystem – R 
 Potable Water Subsystem – PW 
 
A)  A-8  A)9$$-  A:  A;  A<  A=  
 
This equation is only valid if the subsystems’ repair times were independent of the 
other subsystems, but in actuality, they are not.  These repair times are dependent on 
the repair times of other machinery.  For instance, if no other systems are broken, and 
a critical item breaks, its repair time will be short in order to keep the cutter available; 
however, if another system such as the propulsion system is keeping the cutter 
unavailable, the repair time of critical systems will be longer due to the amount of 
time the other system will be unavailable.  Because of this, the availability of the
critical systems is equated using the following equation: 
A)   $8:-8, )9$$-, :, ;, <, = 
Each mission availability calculation contains the terms   A +  A ); 
therefore for simplification of the availability tables, these terms will be simplified in 
the tables that follow.   
 
Small Boats – SB 




 OTH Subsystem – OTH 
 
A-?  A<@8 ' A9@  A<@8  A9@ 
 
Search System – SS 
 Aviation Support Subsystem – A 
 Special Search Components – SSC 
 
A--  A ' A--)  A  A--) 
 
Weapons – W 
 Small Arms – SA* 
 Countermeasure System – CM* 
 25 mm Gun – 25 
 50 cal Guns – 50 
 76 mm Gun – 76 
 Ammo Hoist – AH 
 
For a 270’ cutter:  A=   A76 ' A50  A76  A50(  A@ 
 
For a 210’ cutter:  A=   A25 ' A50  A25  A50(  A@ 
  
 *Not included in overall weapons system availability – See GTST 
 
Any deviations from all of the equations listed above will be noted as it applies to an 
individual mission.  The following tables provide results of the availability analysis 
for each of the seven (7) missions being examined.   Note:  The tables shown for 
Missions #1 to #5 include both 210 ft and 270 ft. cutters.   Due to weapon differences, 
separate charts are shown for 210 ft and 270 ft cutters for Missions #6 to #7.   
 
Table  6:  Availability Analysis for Mission #1, “Search and Rescue” 
$    A+  A)   A ' A<@8 ' A9@  A  A<@8
 A  A9@  A<@8  A9@











Persons   Propulsion   0.76 
to Safety Combined Power Generation   0.88 
    Critical   0.75 




Person  Small RHI Subsystem 0.83   
In Distress Boats OTH Subsystem 0.83   
        
  Search 
Aviation Support 
Subsystem 0.80   
  Systems 
Special Search 
Components 0.98   




Out  Small RHI Subsystem 0.83   
Of Water Boats OTH Subsystem 0.83   
          
  Aviation 
Aviation Support 
Subsystem 0.80   
      
Subgoal 
Availability   
    







Table 7:  Availability Analysis for Mission #2, “Migrant Interdiction” 
  $    A +  A)  -?  SS) 
 






As   Propulsion   0.76 
Holding/ 
Transport Combined Power Generation   0.88 
Platform   Critical   0.75 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.50 










to Cutter Boats OTH Subsystem 0.83   






Subsystem 0.80 1.00 
  Systems 
Special Search 
Components 0.98   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 1.00 
          







Table 8:  Availability Analysis for Mission #3, “Drug Interdiction” 








Transport    Propulsion   0.76 
Smugglers 
to  Combined Power Generation   0.88 
Federal 
Facility   Critical   0.75 
      Subgoal Availability 0.50 
Locate 
Drug Small RHI Subsystem 0.83   
Smugglers Boats OTH Subsystem 0.83   
        
  Search 
Aviation Support 
Subsystem 0.80   
  Systems 
Special Search 
Components 0.98   
      Subgoal Availability 0.97 
Take 
Custody Small RHI Subsystem 0.83   
Of Drugs Boats OTH Subsystem 0.83   
          
  Weapons Small Arms 1.00   
      Subgoal Availability   
Apprehend Small RHI Subsystem 0.83   
Smugglers Boats OTH Subsystem 0.83   




  Weapons Small Arms 1.00   
      Subgoal Availability   
          
      
Drug Interdiction 
Mission Availability 0.49 
 
Table 9:  Availability Analysis for Mission #4, “Living Marine Resources” 
$    A+  A)  -? 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.76 
Waterway Combined Power Generation   0.88 
    Critical   0.75 
      Subgoal Availability 0.50 
Board And  Small RHI Subsystem 0.83 0.97 
Inspect 
Vessel Boats OTH Subsystem 0.83   
      Subgoal Availability 0.97 
    
      
Living Marine Res. 
Mission Availability 0.49 
 
 
Table 10:  Availability Analysis for Mission #5, “Defense Readiness”; 210 ft. 
Cutter 
$    A+  A)  -?  -  A=  A)$ 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.76 
Waterways Combined Power Generation   0.88 
    Critical   0.75 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.50 
Board and  Small RHI Subsystem 0.83 0.97 
Inspect Boats OTH Subsystem 0.83   
Suspicious         
Vessels Weapons Small Arms 1.00   








Attacks   50 cal Guns 1.00   
    Ammo Hoist 0.98   




Attacks Weapons Countermeasure System 0.94   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.94 
          







Table 11:  Availability Analysis for Mission #5, “Defense Readiness”; 270 ft. 
Cutter 
$    A+  A)  -?  -  A=  A)$ 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.76 
Waterways Combined Power Generation   0.88 
    Critical   0.75 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.50 
Board and  Small RHI Subsystem 0.83 0.97 
Inspect Boats OTH Subsystem 0.83   
Suspicious         
Vessels Weapons Small Arms 1.00   




From Weapons 76 mm Gun 0.69   
Attacks   50 cal Guns 1.00   
    Ammo Hoist 0.98   




Attacks Weapons Countermeasure System 0.94   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.94 
          













Table 12:  Availability Analysis for Mission #6, “Port, Waterways, and Coastal 
Security”; (210 ft. Cutter) 
 
$    A+  A)  -?  -  A=  A)$ 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.76 
Waterways Combined Power Generation   0.88 
    Critical   0.75 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.50 
Board and  Small RHI Subsystem 0.83 0.97 
Inspect Boats OTH Subsystem 0.83   
Suspicious         
Vessels Weapons Small Arms 1.00   




From Weapons 25 mm Gun 0.98   
Attacks   50 cal Guns 1.00   
    Ammo Hoist 0.98   




Attacks Weapons Countermeasure System 0.94   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.94 
          






Table 13:  Availability Analysis for Mission #6, “Port, Waterways, and Coastal 





$    A+  A)  -?  -  A=  A)$ 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.76 
Waterways Combined Power Generation   0.88 
    Critical   0.75 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.50 
Board and  Small RHI Subsystem 0.83 0.97 
Inspect Boats OTH Subsystem 0.83   
Suspicious         
Vessels Weapons Small Arms 1.00   




From Weapons 76 mm Gun 0.69   
Attacks   50 cal Guns 1.00   
    Ammo Hoist 0.98   




Attacks Weapons Countermeasure System 0.94   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.94 
          







Table 14:  Availability Analysis for Mission #7, “Other Law Enforcement” 
$    A+  A)  -?  - 
 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.76 
Waterway Combined Power Generation   0.88 
    Critical   0.75 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.50 
Board And  Small RHI Subsystem 0.83 0.97 





          
  Weapons Small Arms 1.00 1.00 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.97 
    
      





A summary of mission availabilities from the analysis is provided in Table 15 below. 
 
Mission Availability  
1 - Search and Rescue 0.5 
2 - Migrant Interdiction 0.48 
3 - Drug Interdiction 0.49 
4 - Living Marine Resources 0.48 
5 - Defense Readiness 0.46 
6 - Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security 0.46 
7 - Other Law Enforcement 0.48 
 
Table 15:   Summary of Overall Mission Availability (210/270 ft. Cutters) 
 
 















 3.2.3.1 Summary of Research Question Two 
Research Question #2 asks:  “How can engineering data about cutter 
maintenance activities be transformed into constructive operational informati n about 
availability?”  Coast Guard operations are concerned with cutters being available to 
complete the mandated missions.  The above analysis shows how casualty repair 
times can be transformed into operational availability.  From the operational 
standpoint, cutters are expected to be available a minimum of 55% of the year.  
Therefore, this analysis shows that, for the past seven years, the medium endurance 
cutters (210 ft and 270 ft) have not met their target availability as shown in Figure 26.  
This is, in part, why reliability-centered maintenance principles were mandated in 
2004 and a reliability engineering program was implemented in 2009.  Using data 
from 2003 to 2010, one can see that the limiting factors of availability come from the 
critical and propulsion systems categories.  Improving the availability of just these 
two systems alone will improve overall total mission availability.  This then can be 
construed as a primary goal for US Coast Guard fleet reliability engineering program.   
 
3.2.4 Comparison of Mission Availability by Maintenance Program Principles 
Timeline 
 As noted in Chapter 1 and above, the Coast Guard surface fleet has shifted 
from preventive maintenance to reliability centered maintenance in recent years.  
Research Question #3 asks “How has the shift in maintenance ideologies impacted 




comparing mission availabilities based on the three time periods of differing 
maintenance ideologies.  The above total CASREP data was separated into three 
categories:  a)  “Prior to 2004” when preventive maintenance was the dominant 
maintenance ideology,  b) “2005-2009” when reliability centered principles were 
mandated, but no real program stood up, and c) “After 2009” when the reliability 
program was  implemented.   The three categories of data were analyzed using the 
same approach as in section 3.2.3.  A summary of the mission availability percentages 
is shown in Table 16.  Tables detailing each mission individually can be found in 
Appendix II.  A comparison of these availabilities to the minimum desired 
availability of 0.55 is shown in Figure 27.  Tables 17 and 18 detail availability, 
number of casreps, and repair times by system and subsystem.  Analyzing the data in 
this manner could be useful for making decisions regarding allocating mainten nce 
resources. 
Mission Prior to 2004 2005-2009 After 2009 
  Availability  Availability  Availability  
Migrant Interdiction 0.66 0.44 0.37 
Search and Rescue 0.69 0.46 0.38 
Living Marine Resources 0.68 0.45 0.37 
Other Law Enforcement 0.68 0.45 0.37 
Drug Interdiction 0.6 0.38 0.3 
Defense Readiness 0.63 0.43 0.36 
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security 0.63 0.43 0.36 
 






Figure 27:  Mission Availabilities by Category Compared to Minimum Desired 
System and Subsystem 
Availability 
Prior to 
2004 2005-2009 After 2009 Overall 
  Availability  Availability  Availability  Availability  
Propulsion 0.89 0.75 0.67 0.76 
#1 Main Diesel Engine Subsystem 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.77 
#2 Main Diesel Engine Subsystem 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.77 
Propulsion Controls 0.93 0.79 0.73 0.8 
          
Power Generation 0.94 0.83 0.83 0.88 
#1 Ship Service Diesel Generator 
Subsystem 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.93 
#2 Ship Service Diesel Generator 
Subsystem 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.93 
Emergency Diesel Generator 
Subsystem 0.96 0.95 0.92 0.95 
Generator Controls 0.95 0.84 0.84 0.89 
          
Critical 0.83 0.74 0.69 0.75 
Structural Integrity Components 0.91 0.76 0.75 0.79 
Communications Subsystem 1 1 1 1 
Navigation Subsystem 1 1 1 1 
Firemain Subsystem 0.88 0.84 0.87 0.78 


















Sewage Subsystem 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 
Potable Water Subsystem 0.83 0.74 0.69 0.75 
          
Weapons  ----- ----- ----- ----- 
76 mm Gun 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.67 
25 mm Gun 0.98 0.97 1 0.98 
50 cal Guns 1 1 1 1 
Ammo Hoist  0.96 0.99 0.96 0.98 
Small Arms 1 1 1 1 
Countermeasure System 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.94 
          
Other  ----- ----- ----- ----- 
RHI Boat Subsystem 0.87 0.82 0.81 0.83 
OTH Boat Subsystem 0.87 0.82 0.81 0.83 
Aviation Support System 0.88 0.85 0.81 0.8 
Special Search Tools 0.79 0.98 0.99 0.98 
 




























Propulsion 342 29 1161 49 345 39 1848 39 
#1 Main Diesel 
Engine 
Subsystem 148 34 467 52 132 41 747 42 
#2 Main Diesel 
Engine 
Subsystem 148 34 467 52 132 41 747 42 
Propulsion 
Controls 46 19 227 45 81 34 354 33 
                  
Power 
Generation 122 40 553 52 157 45 832 46 
#1 Ship Service 
Diesel 
Generator 
Subsystem 45 37 211 30 54 29 310 32 













Subsystem 8 58 48 52 13 62 69 57 
Generator 
Controls 24 26 83 96 36 45 143 55 
                  
Critical 451 47 2312 55 645 37 3408 46 
Structural 
Integrity 
Components 20 58 122 95 52 49 194 67 
Communicatio
n Subsystem 232 40 892 43 242 36 1366 40 
Navigation 
Subsystem 85 44 728 44 198 33 1011 40 
Firemain 
Subsystem 33 46 152 51 34 43 219 47 
Refrigeration 
Subsystem 23 46 128 63 36 41 187 50 
Sewage 
Subsystem 5 54 32 39 10 18 47 37 
Potable Water 
Subsystem 53 41 258 49 73 43 384 44 
                  
Weapons 192 25 592 47 118 24 902 32 
76 mm Gun 151 26 486 33 98 34 735 31 
25 mm Gun 17 17 57 25 3 5 77 16 
50 cal Guns 0 0 4 29 0 0 4 10 
Ammo Hoist  6 66 4 130 5 84 15 93 
Small Arms 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Countermeasur
e System 18 42 41 65 12 23 71 43 
                  
Other  269 44 900 46 278 38 1447 43 
RHI Boat 
Subsystem 93 33 422 41 118 32 633 36 
OTH Boat 
Subsystem 93 33 322 41 118 32 533 35 
Aviation 






Availability Prior to 2004 2005-2009 After 2009 Overall 
System 
Special Search 
Tools 60 44 26 45 3 40 89 43 
 
Table 18: Number of Casreps and Average Repair Times by System and Subsystems 
 
3.2.4.1 Summary of Research Question Three 
 Research Question #3 asks “How has the shift in maintenance ideologies 
impacted the medium endurance cutters’ mission availabilities?”.  It is apparent that 
there is a downward trend in mission availability based on the implementation of the 
full-scale reliability engineering program.  This trend could be due to several factors.  
First, the data available prior to 2004 and after 2009 was quite limited by the 
information captured within FLS and therefore could have impacted the availability 
percentages.  More data would provide a more accurate picture.  It may also be 
several years before the full impact of the reliability engineering program are seen.  
Lastly, even though new maintenance programs are introduced, the cutters are still
aging.  With an average of 37 years in operation, maintaining these cutters in g neral 
is a challenging task.  However, based on the data analysis, if the Coast Guard hopes 
to improve the mission availability of the medium endurance cutters, it must improve 







3.3 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter investigates in detail the relationship between component and 
subsystem reliability/availability and overall cutter availability for seven key missions 
of the medium endurance class cutters (210 ft and 270 ft in length).   This 
investigation is an exploratory, empirical analysis of component and subsystem 
failures based on actual collected failure data and repair times (via the CASREP 
system).   The investigation analyzes a time period of October 2003 through January 
2011.    See Section 3.2 for a description of the analytical model and methods used in 
this investigation.  Section 3.3 provides the primary results for each study.    
Overall cutter availability is a key metric for the US Coast Guard fleet
reliability engineering program.   From an operational standpoint, Coast Guard cutters 
are expected to be available of minimum of 55% of the year.  This corresponds to 
4,820 hours of availability per year.  Key results of this analysis and investigation are 
as follows: 
  
 The calculated total cutter availability for the seven analyzed missions 
ranges from 46% to 50%, compared to the mandated minimum 
requirement of 55%.  Thus, for the past seven years, medium endurance 
cutters have not achieved their target availability.  See Section 3.2.3 for 
specific results.   
 
 The primary limiting factors causing less than mandated availability 




and b) critical subsystems grouping, including communications, 
navigation, firemain, refrigeration, sewage, and potable water.  Increasing 
the availability of only these two categories will dramatically improve 
overall total mission availability.   
 
 The mission availabilities of the medium endurance cutters have decreased 
over time even as new maintenance principles have been introduced.   The 
analysis was performed for three distinct time periods:  a)  “Prior to 2004” 
when preventive maintenance was the dominant maintenance ideology,  b) 
“2005-2009” when reliability centered principles were mandated, but no 
real program stood up, and c) “After 2009” when the reliability program 
was  implemented.   Unfortunately, overall medium endurance cutter 
availability has decreased significantly over these three time periods.   See 
Section 3.2.4 for specific results.  
 
 
 Several possible causes for the decrease in overall cutter availability are 
proposed.  These include collected data limitations which may partially 
impact the availability percentages.  Also, there is a probable time delay 
before the full impact of the improvements already made in the reliability 
engineering program will be observed.  Last, and very importantly, the 
Coast Guard medium endurance cutter fleet continues to age with the 






Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
 
4.1 Analysis Conclusions 
 One major goal of the surface fleet reliability engineering program is to 
increase cutter mission availability through improved maintenance policies and 
practices.  The analysis and investigation in Chapter 3 yielded lower than desired 
cutter mission availability percentages and also a worsening trend in mission 
availability over time.   See Table 19 below for a summary of key analysis results 
(see also Section 3.3).   
Item Key Result Impact or Discussion 
1 Total medium endurance cutter 
availability over last 8 years ranges 
from 46%  to 50%, pending mission 
type. 
Cutters are not meeting 
desired annual availability of 
55% (4,820 hours per year). 
2 The primary two cutter subsystem 
categories accounting for the bulk of 
the availability shortcoming are a) 
main propulsion and b) critical 
auxiliary systems.  
Increasing the availability of 
only these two categories 
will dramatically improve 
overall cutter mission 
availability.  
3 Cutter mission availabilities have 
decreased significantly over the 
analysis period, even as new 
maintenance principles have been 
introduced.  
US Coast Guard must 
improve upon the current 
cutter reliability engineering 
program.   Also, further 
analysis must be done to 
examine the impact of the 
average cutter age of 37 
years.    





Because cutter availability goals were not met, one must question why the current 
program has not increased availability percentages, and what actions can be taken to 
improve the current program.  Through the SSM process and CASREP data analysis, 
it was found that while the reliability engineering program has identified th  decline 
in cutter availability, the Coast Guard must increase its priority on further developing 
this program.  First the current shortcomings of the program must be identified.  Th  
shortcomings in the current reliability program are due to the lack of funding, the age 
of existing assets, and the Coast Guard culture.  Implementation improvements will 
be discussed in section 4.2 below.    
4.1.1 Lack of Funding 
 One aspect of the new reliability engineering program that is working is the
concept of centralized funding.  Each product line controls their portion of the budget 
to maintain their assigned cutters.  This provides the Coast Guard with a more 
accurate assessment of the relationship between cost, asset availability, and operating 
hours.  Essentially, the goal is to enable each Product Line to be able to determine he 
cost of operating asset in terms of dollars per operational hour to include maintenance 
and CASREP costs along with operational costs.  However, even with centralized 
funding, the money is not always available.  The Coast Guard has a history of 
learning to do more with less, and this trend only continues as budget cuts mean that 
programs such as the reliability program face a lack of funding to accomplish their 




which only exacerbates the growing maintenance needs.  Budget cuts also cause 
logistics problems when trying to order spare and replacement parts for asets that are 
already at or nearing the end of their supportable life cycle, thus increasing repair 
times when a casualty increases, and decreasing cutter mission availability.  Th s, and 
future analyses, of maintenance data could be used to improve the allocation of 
maintenance funding. 
4.1.2 Age of Existing Assets 
 Coupled with the lack of funding, the age of existing assets hinders the 
success of the surface fleet reliability program.  Maintaining 50+ years old assets 
proves to be a challenging task with even the most established maintenance programs, 
let alone a program in its infancy such as the one investigated in this thesis.  Although 
the Coast Guard has done a very effective job keeping assets operational until 
onboard equipment is nearly unsupportable through the original equipment 
manufacturer, if the Coast Guard hopes to extend the mission availability of the 
medium endurance cutters, it must improve the surface fleet reliability program at a 
greater rate than the cutters are aging.   
4.1.3 Coast Guard Culture 
 Lastly, the culture of the Coast Guard has a significant impact on the 
successful implementation of the surface fleet reliability program, and should not be 
overlooked.  The program was implemented in 2009 to meet a modernization 
timeline; however, this was before all of the training and infrastructure on the lower
levels of the chain of command was completed and in place.  There is also little 




the Surface Forces Logistics Center.  This means that the operators and maintainers of 
the aging assets do not understand the maintenance needs, casualty reporting, and 
data logging required to keep them in operation.  Information needs to be filtrated 
throughout the entirety of the Coast Guard down to the deck plate level in order to 
obtain complete understanding and buy-in of the program.   
 
4.2 Improving the Reliability Engineering Program  
One of the key research questions for this work asks “How can the Surface 
Forces Logistics Center improve its implementation of the reliability engineering 
program?”.   This is identified as Research Question #4 in Section 1.4.    Answers and 
conclusions on Research Questions #1 through #3 have provided the necessary 
background information to fully answer Research Question #4.  Refer to Section 2.9 
(Question #1), Section 3.2.3.1 (Question #2) and Section 3.2.3.2 (Question #3) for 
detailed discussion on each of the four research questions.   The key 
recommendations to improving the current reliability engineering program were 
discovered through the SSM identifying desirable and feasible changes proces.   
These are described in significant detail in Section 2.8 and summarized as follows.    
4.2.1 Provide Appropriate Training for Each Command Level 
The biggest improvement to the reliability program will be providing tailored 
training to each level of the organization.  A large-scale program such as thisrelies on 
everyone to be successful from the Captain at the high-level that requests funding 
from Congress to the new machinery technician that completes the maintenance on 




may have had a large impact on its success during the program’s infancy; however, 
training at this stage will still help the program to succeed in the future.  Training on 
standard CASREP terminology and reporting procedures will improve the CASREP 
database to provide a more accurate picture of availability due to casualties.  Along 
with this, the CASREP EIC’s can be updated and modified to best serve the Coast 
Guard and its needs that may differ from the Navy with training on exactly what 
information the Coast Guard desires for its CASREP reporting system.   
4.2.2 Cultural Change 
A cultural change will also greatly improve the implementation of the 
reliability engineering program.  As aforementioned, the Coast Guard, and engine rs 
in particular, have learned to do more with less.  This has caused individuals to 
circumvent the standard processes to effect machinery repairs quicker and che per, 
such as using non-standard replacement components.  Unfortunately even though the 
component is repaired quicker, it undermines the goals and purpose of the reliability 
program.  Without the necessary documentation to show that more money and 
personnel are needed to operate and maintain current assets, the Coast Guard cannot 
vie for more Congressional funding, which only hampers those who attempt to follow 
the proper maintenance channels.  Once everyone is properly trained on the new 
reliability engineering program procedures, there needs to be accountability for those 
who do not follow the standardized maintenance procedures as outlined in the surface 





4.2.3 Improved Information Flow 
 Along with a cultural change, a change in the overall information flow must 
occur for the reliability engineering program to be successful.  Approximately 
twenty-five percent of a cutter crew rotates out each year which can cause challenges 
to accurately documenting the cutter condition as personnel responsibilities change as 
documentation requires the direct input of information into multiple databases.  A 
streamlined “closed-loop” process for both planned and unplanned maintenance 
needs to be developed into a single database that can be accessed by all necessary 
individuals.  Information also needs to be translated routinely to the operations 
division of the Coast Guard.  By showing the current availability percentages and 
trends to operators, it will stress the importance of making maintenance a positive 
priority and rather than a hindrance.  Once maintenance buy-in is achieved 
throughout the Coast Guard, the reliability engineering program will make a marked 
difference in achieving the desired cutter mission availability percentag s. 
4.2.4 In-Service Time 
 Time plays a large role in the success of a newly implemented program.  All 
of the aforementioned implementation improvements will take time; therefore, as 
time progresses, so will the success of the reliability engineering program.  With the 
ever-changing political and funding situations, the Coast Guard has learned to be an 
adaptable organization, but it cannot change overnight.  As individuals receive 
training on the new program, a cultural change will occur.  And as the cultural change 
occurs, information flow will happen, which will improve the cutter mission 




Chapter 3 and the changes mentioned in this chapter, the surface fleet can evolve its 
current reliability engineering program into a more successful one. 
4.3 Recommendations for Future Work 
 This thesis studied the current status of the Coast Guard’s surface fleet 
reliability engineering program, and addressed the mission availability of cutters 
based on unplanned maintenance repairs to the larger and more vital cutter systems.  
Once the recently implemented reliability program has been in service longer, a other 
study to evaluate its effectiveness with regards to casualty repair times and mission 
availability would be beneficial.  It would also be useful to analyze availability versus 
the cutter operating area to see if a specific environment affects the rate of casualties 
more than others.  As more data is gathered, it would be prudent to investigate the 
dependencies among the systems and subsystems in order to provide the most 
accurate view of availability.  In addition, a study to evaluate the operating cost per 
hour under the reliability engineering program would assist senior leaders to make 
correct decisions regarding new acquisitions and the feasibility of maintaining ag ng 
assets. 
4.4 Final Conclusions 
 This study revealed less than desirable outcomes of the implementation of the 
surface fleet reliability engineering program, specifically with the mission availability 
of the medium endurance cutters.  The program was implemented before employee 
buy-in was achieved, and prior to training personnel on the new processes and 




Coast Guard can adapt its program to fit the needs of the service.  Funding has been, 
and will continue to be, an issue in maintaining Coast Guard assets.  By conducting 
future analyses such as in this thesis, the Coast Guard will be able to justify to 
Congress the per hour operating cost necessary to properly maintain the cutters in 
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Table 39: Mission #2, “Migrant Interdiction” - Availability Calculations 
Table 40: Mission #3, “Drug Interdiction” – Availability Calculations 
Table 41: Mission #4, “Living Marine Resources” – Availability Calculations 
Table 42/43: Mission #5, “Defense Readiness” – Availability Calculations 
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Up to 2004:  10/1/2003 – 12/31/2004 
 
Table 20:  Mission #1, “Search and Rescue” – Availability Calculations 






Persons   Propulsion   0.89 
to Safety Combined Power Generation   0.94 
    Critical   0.83 




Person  Small RHI Subsystem 0.87   
In Distress Boats OTH Subsystem 0.87   
        
  Search 
Aviation Support 
Subsystem 0.88   
  Systems Special Search Components 0.79   




Out  Small RHI Subsystem 0.87   
Of Water Boats OTH Subsystem 0.87   
          
  Aviation 
Aviation Support 
Subsystem 0.88   
      
Subgoal 
Availability   
    





Table 21:  Availability Analysis for Mission #2, “Migrant Interdiction” 






As   Propulsion   0.89 
Holding/Tran
sport Combined Power Generation   0.94 
Platform   Critical   0.83 




Migrants Small RHI Subsystem 0.87 0.98 








Migrants Search Aviation Support Subsystem 0.88 0.97 
  Systems Special Search Components 0.79   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.97 
          






Table 22:  Availability Analysis for Mission #3, “Drug Interdiction” 





Transport    Propulsion   0.89 
Smugglers 
to  Combined Power Generation   0.94 
Federal 
Facility   Critical   0.83 




Drug Small RHI Subsystem 0.87   
Smugglers Boats OTH Subsystem 0.87   
        
  Search 
Aviation Support 
Subsystem 0.88   
  Systems Special Search Components 0.79   




Custody Small RHI Subsystem 0.87   
Of Drugs Boats OTH Subsystem 0.87   
          
  Weapons Small Arms 1.00   
      
Subgoal 
Availability   
Apprehend Small RHI Subsystem 0.87   
Smugglers Boats OTH Subsystem 0.87   
          
  Weapons Small Arms 1.00   
      
Subgoal 
Availability   










Table 23:  Availability Analysis for Mission #4, “Living Marine Resources” 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.89 
Waterway Combined Power Generation   0.94 
    Critical   0.83 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.69 
Board And  Small RHI Subsystem 0.87 0.98 
Inspect 
Vessel Boats OTH Subsystem 0.87   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.98 
    
      













Patrol   Propulsion   0.89 
Waterways 
Combine
d Power Generation   0.94 
    Critical   0.83 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.69 
Board and  Small RHI Subsystem 0.87 0.98 
Inspect Boats OTH Subsystem 0.87   
Suspicious         
Vessels Weapons Small Arms 1.00   








Attacks   50 cal Guns 1.00   
    Ammo Hoist 0.97   




Attacks Weapons Countermeasure System 0.94   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.94 
          
      
Defense Readiness 
Mission Availability 
(210' Cutter) 0.63 
 
 
Table 25:  Availability Analysis for Mission #5, “Defense Readiness”; 270 ft. 
Cutter 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.89 
Waterways Combined Power Generation   0.94 
    Critical   0.83 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.69 
Board and  Small RHI Subsystem 0.87 0.98 
Inspect Boats OTH Subsystem 0.87   
Suspicious         
Vessels Weapons Small Arms 1.00   




From Weapons 76 mm Gun 0.68   
Attacks   50 cal Guns 1.00   
    Ammo Hoist 0.97   




Attacks Weapons Countermeasure System 0.94   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.94 
          










Table 26:  Availability Analysis for Mission #6, “Port, Waterways, and Coastal 
Security”; (210 ft. Cutter) 
 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.89 
Waterways Combined Power Generation   0.94 
    Critical   0.83 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.69 
Board and  Small RHI Subsystem 0.87 0.98 
Inspect Boats OTH Subsystem 0.87   
Suspicious         
Vessels Weapons Small Arms 1.00   




From Weapons 25 mm Gun 0.98   
Attacks   50 cal Guns 1.00   
    Ammo Hoist 0.97   




Attacks Weapons Countermeasure System 0.94   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.94 
          





Table 27:  Availability Analysis for Mission #6, “Port, Waterways, and Coastal 
Security”; (270 ft. Cutter)  
Subgoal System Subsystem/Component 
Subsystem 
 Availability  
System Total 
Availability  
Patrol   Propulsion   0.89 
Waterways Combined Power Generation   0.94 
    Critical   0.83 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.69 
Board and  Small RHI Subsystem 0.87 0.98 




Suspicious         
Vessels Weapons Small Arms 1.00   




From Weapons 76 mm Gun 0.68   
Attacks   50 cal Guns 1.00   
    Ammo Hoist 0.97   




Attacks Weapons Countermeasure System 0.94   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.94 
          






Table 28:  Availability Analysis for Mission #7, “Other Law Enforcement” 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.89 
Waterway Combined Power Generation   0.94 
    Critical   0.83 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.69 
Board And  Small RHI Subsystem 0.87 0.98 
Inspect 
Vessel Boats OTH Subsystem 0.87   
          
  Weapons Small Arms 1.00 1.00 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.98 
    
      









2005 - 2009:  1/1/2005 – 12/31/2009 
Table 29:  Mission #1, “Search and Rescue” – Availability Calculations 






Persons   Propulsion   0.75 
to Safety Combined Power Generation   0.83 
    Critical   0.74 




Person  Small RHI Subsystem 0.82   
In Distress Boats OTH Subsystem 0.82   
        
  Search 
Aviation Support 
Subsystem 0.85   
  Systems Special Search Components 0.98   




Out  Small RHI Subsystem 0.82   
Of Water Boats OTH Subsystem 0.82   
          
  Aviation 
Aviation Support 
Subsystem 0.85   
      
Subgoal 
Availability   
    





Table 30:  Availability Analysis for Mission #2, “Migrant Interdiction”  






As   Propulsion   0.75 
Holding/Tran
sport Combined Power Generation   0.83 
Platform   Critical   0.74 




Migrants Small RHI Subsystem 0.82 0.97 
to Cutter Boats OTH Subsystem 0.82   







Migrants Search Aviation Support Subsystem 0.85 1.00 
  Systems Special Search Components 0.98   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 1.00 
          






Table 31:  Availability Analysis for Mission #3, “Drug Interdiction” 





Transport    Propulsion   0.75 
Smugglers 
to  Combined Power Generation   0.83 
Federal 
Facility   Critical   0.74 




Drug Small RHI Subsystem 0.82   
Smuggler  Boats OTH Subsystem 0.82   
        
  Search 
Aviation Support 
Subsystem 0.85   
  Systems Special Search Components 0.98   




Custody Small RHI Subsystem 0.82   
Of Drugs Boats OTH Subsystem 0.82   
          
  Weapons Small Arms 1.00   
      
Subgoal 
Availability   
Apprehend Small RHI Subsystem 0.82   
Smugglers Boats OTH Subsystem 0.82   
          
  Weapons Small Arms 1.00   
      
Subgoal 
Availability   
          








Table 32:  Availability Analysis for Mission #4, “Living Marine Resources” 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.75 
Waterway Combined Power Generation   0.83 
    Critical   0.74 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.46 
Board And  Small RHI Subsystem 0.82 0.97 
Inspect 
Vessel Boats OTH Subsystem 0.82   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.97 
    
      






Table 33:  Availability Analysis for Mission #5, “Defense Readiness”; 210 ft. 
Cutter  





Patrol   Propulsion   0.75 
Waterways Combined Power Generation   0.83 
    Critical   0.74 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.46 
Board and  Small RHI Subsystem 0.82 0.97 
Inspect Boats OTH Subsystem 0.82   
Suspicious         
Vessels Weapons Small Arms 1.00   




From Weapons 25 mm Gun 0.97   
Attacks   50 cal Guns 1.00   
    Ammo Hoist 0.99   




Attacks Weapons Countermeasure System 0.95   






          







Table 34:  Availability Analysis for Mission #5, “Defense Readiness”; 270 ft. 
Cutter 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.75 
Waterways Combined Power Generation   0.83 
    Critical   0.74 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.46 
Board and  Small RHI Subsystem 0.82 0.97 
Inspect Boats OTH Subsystem 0.82   
Suspicious         
Vessels Weapons Small Arms 1.00   




From Weapons 76 mm Gun 0.68   
Attacks   50 cal Guns 1.00   
    Ammo Hoist 0.99   




Attacks Weapons Countermeasure System 0.95   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.95 
          














Table 35:  Availability Analysis for Mission #6, “Port, Waterways, and Coastal 
Security”; (210 ft. Cutter) 
 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.75 
Waterways Combined Power Generation   0.83 
    Critical   0.74 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.46 
Board and  Small RHI Subsystem 0.82 0.97 
Inspect Boats OTH Subsystem 0.82   
Suspicious         
Vessels Weapons Small Arms 1.00   




From Weapons 25 mm Gun 0.97   
Attacks   50 cal Guns 1.00   
    Ammo Hoist 0.99   




Attacks Weapons Countermeasure System 0.95   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.95 
          






Table 36:  Availability Analysis for Mission #6, “Port, Waterways, and Coastal 
Security”; (270 ft. Cutter) 
 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.75 
Waterways Combined Power Generation   0.83 
    Critical   0.74 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.46 
Board and  Small RHI Subsystem 0.82 0.97 




Suspicious         
Vessels Weapons Small Arms 1.00   




From Weapons 76 mm Gun 0.68   
Attacks   50 cal Guns 1.00   
    Ammo Hoist 0.99   




Attacks Weapons Countermeasure System 0.95   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.95 
          





Table 37:  Availability Analysis for Mission #7, “Other Law Enforcement”  





Patrol   Propulsion   0.75 
Waterway Combined Power Generation   0.83 
    Critical   0.74 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.46 
Board And  Small RHI Subsystem 0.82 0.97 
Inspect 
Vessel Boats OTH Subsystem 0.82   
          
  Weapons Small Arms 1.00 1.00 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.97 
    
      










Table 38:  Mission #1, “Search and Rescue” – Availability Calculations 
 






Persons   Propulsion   0.67 
to Safety Combined Power Generation   0.83 
    Critical   0.69 




Person  Small RHI Subsystem 0.81   
In Distress Boats OTH Subsystem 0.81   
        
  Search Aviation Support Subsystem 0.81   
  Systems Special Search Components 0.99   




Out  Small RHI Subsystem 0.81   
Of Water Boats OTH Subsystem 0.81   
          
  Aviation Aviation Support Subsystem 0.81   
      
Subgoal 
Availability   
    






Table 39:  Availability Analysis for Mission #2, “Migrant Interdiction” 






As   Propulsion   0.67 
Holding/Tran
sport Combined Power Generation   0.83 
Platform   Critical   0.69 




Migrants Small RHI Subsystem 0.81 0.96 
to Cutter Boats OTH Subsystem 0.81   










  Systems 
Special Search 
Components 0.99   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 1.00 
          






Table 40:  Availability Analysis for Mission #3, “Drug Interdiction” 
Subgoal System Subsystem/Component 
Subsystem 
 Availability  
System Total 
Availability  
Transport    Propulsion   0.67 
Smugglers 
to  Combined Power Generation   0.83 
Federal 
Facility   Critical   0.69 




Drug Small RHI Subsystem 0.81   
Smuggler Boats OTH Subsystem 0.81   
        
  Search 
Aviation Support 
Subsystem 0.81   
  Systems Special Search Components 0.99   




Custody Small RHI Subsystem 0.81   
Of Drugs Boats OTH Subsystem 0.81   
          
  Weapons Small Arms 1.00   
      
Subgoal 
Availability   
Apprehend Small RHI Subsystem 0.81   
Smugglers Boats OTH Subsystem 0.81   
          
  Weapons Small Arms 1.00   
      
Subgoal 
Availability   
          









Table 41:  Availability Analysis for Mission #4, “Living Marine Resources” 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.67 
Waterway Combined Power Generation   0.83 
    Critical   0.69 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.38 
Board And  Small RHI Subsystem 0.81 0.96 
Inspect 
Vessel Boats OTH Subsystem 0.81   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.96 
    
      





Table 42:  Availability Analysis for Mission #5, “Defense Readiness”; 210 ft. 
Cutter 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.67 
Waterways Combined Power Generation   0.83 
    Critical   0.69 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.38 
Board and  Small RHI Subsystem 0.81 0.96 
Inspect Boats OTH Subsystem 0.81   
Suspicious         
Vessels Weapons Small Arms 1.00   




From Weapons 25 mm Gun 1.00   
Attacks   50 cal Guns 1.00   
    Ammo Hoist 0.96   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.96 





      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.97 
          







Table 43:  Availability Analysis for Mission #5, “Defense Readiness”; 270 ft. 
Cutter 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.67 
Waterways Combined Power Generation   0.83 
    Critical   0.69 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.38 
Board and  Small RHI Subsystem 0.81 0.96 
Inspect Boats OTH Subsystem 0.81   
Suspicious         
Vessels Weapons Small Arms 1.00   




From Weapons 76 mm Gun 0.67   
Attacks   50 cal Guns 1.00   
    Ammo Hoist 0.96   




Attacks Weapons Countermeasure System 0.97   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.97 
          

















Table 44:  Availability Analysis for Mission #6, “Port, Waterways, and Coastal 
Security”; (210 ft. Cutter) 
 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.67 
Waterways Combined Power Generation   0.83 
    Critical   0.69 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.38 
Board and  Small RHI Subsystem 0.81 0.96 
Inspect Boats OTH Subsystem 0.81   
Suspicious         
Vessels Weapons Small Arms 1.00   




From Weapons 25 mm Gun 1.00   
Attacks   50 cal Guns 1.00   
    Ammo Hoist 0.96   




Attacks Weapons Countermeasure System 0.97   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.97 
          





Table 45:  Availability Analysis for Mission #6, “Port, Waterways, and Coastal 
Security”; (270 ft. Cutter) 
 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.67 
Waterways Combined Power Generation   0.83 
    Critical   0.69 
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.38 
Board and  Small RHI Subsystem 0.81 0.96 




Suspicious         
Vessels Weapons Small Arms 1.00   




From Weapons 76 mm Gun 0.67   
Attacks   50 cal Guns 1.00   
    Ammo Hoist 0.96   




Attacks Weapons Countermeasure System 0.97   
      
Subgoal 
Availability 0.97 
          







Table 46:  Availability Analysis for Mission #7, “Other Law Enforcement” 





Patrol   Propulsion   0.67 
Waterway Combined Power Generation   0.83 
    Critical   0.69 
      Subgoal Availability 0.38 
Board And  Small RHI Subsystem 0.81 0.96 
Inspect 
Vessel Boats OTH Subsystem 0.81   
          
  Weapons Small Arms 1.00 1.00 
      Subgoal Availability 0.96 
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